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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1

29 JULY 1970

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**

29 July 1970  
(VOL. XXI, NO. 30)

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## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 20 - 26 JULY 1970

Moscow (4041 items)

Middle East	(8%)	11%
[UAR Revolution Anniversary]	(--)	7%]
Indochina	(8%)	8%
Polish National Day	(0.1%)	7%
Navy Day	(--)	5%
China	(6%)	4%
Cuban Uprising Anniversary	(--)	4%
Upcoming CPSU Congress	(4%)	3%
Kekkonen Visit to USSR	(1%)	3%
UK-South African Arms Agreement	(0.3%)	2%

Peking (2665 items)

Domestic Issues	(35%)	29%
Indochina	(22%)	28%
[Cambodia]	(12%)	10%]
[Geneva Agreements Anniversary]	(--)	5%]
Vice President of Congo-B in PRC	(5%)	8%
Romanian Military Delegation in PRC	(--)	5%
Korean Military Delegation in PRC	(--)	4%
UK-South African Arms Agreement	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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## INDOCHINA

Both the PRG and DRV delegates at the 23 July session of the Paris talks complained that President Nixon in his 20 July press conference had again voiced his opposition to a coalition government in South Vietnam, but Vietnamese communist media have not commented on the President's remarks. Pro forma charges that the United States has "trampled" on the Geneva agreements and the Vietnamese peoples' rights are voiced by Premier Pham Van Dong in a "recent" interview with Prague's CTK correspondent in Hanoi, released by VNA and Czech media on the 23d.

Ambassador Bruce's appointment to head the U.S. delegation at the Paris talks continues to be called a token gesture, and a Liberation Radio commentary on the 28th says that the South Vietnamese people "will never entertain any illusions on the Nixon clique's false, deceitful peace arguments."

Authoritative Peking comment denouncing the U.S. "peace talks fraud" and implicitly accusing the Soviets of "collaboration" includes a 27 July joint PEOPLE'S DAILY-LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorial on the anniversary of the signing of the Korean armistice.

Moscow continues to attack Peking's Indochina policies in routine-level comment. And Soviet commentators say that hopes for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam have been dashed by the President's press conference on the 20th when he voiced his opposition to a coalition government and a more rapid troop withdrawal.

Routine attention to military action in Cambodia focuses on Kompong Cham, Kompong Chhnang, and Kandal provinces and the area around Kirirom in Kompong Speu Province. A 23 July statement by Sihanouk's government denouncing an alleged Thai "invasion" of Cambodia is endorsed in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the 28th. According to Hanoi on the 26th, the DRV army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN sees Premier Lon Nol's visit to Bangkok as a "search" for aid resulting from "panic and gloom in the face of the revolutionary storms of the Cambodian people."

## U.S. POLICY SCORED AT PARIS, BY LIBERATION RADIO

The 23 July Paris session produced the usual charges from communist delegates Dinh Ba Thi and Nguyen Minh Vy: that the Nixon Administration does not desire a peaceful settlement of

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the war, is intent on war expansion throughout Indochina, is maintaining the "dictatorial" Thieu-Ky-Khiem Administration, and opposes the NFLSV/PRG 10-point solution. The nearly identical VNA and LPA accounts of PRG delegate Dinh Ba Thi's statement briefly note that he recalled the Con Son prison "tiger cages"\* and "exposed" President Thieu's alleged preference for a military victory and recent reaffirmation of opposition to any form of coalition government. VNA also notes briefly that Thi "criticized" President Nixon's 20 July statement for opposing the formation of a coalition government representing "all strata" of the people.

VNA publicizes DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy's pre-conference statement in which he "strongly" protested U.S. air and artillery strikes against the DRV on 19, 20, and 21 July and quoted the DRV Foreign Ministry's 22 July protest statement. The VNA account of his formal conference statement notes cryptically that he denounced the "bellicose acts of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia." The account omits such specific remarks as Vy's charging the United States and the GVN with concentrating "many units" on the South Vietnamese-Laotian border across from Saravane "ready to attack Laos."

In saying that Vy blamed the Nixon Administration for the Paris deadlock and the expansion of the war to all Indochina, the VNA account ignores his reference to President Nixon's 20 July news conference remarks, and his 1 July TV interview and 30 June Cambodia report. Vy scored the President for his "unreasonable demand" for a mutual troop withdrawal and his opposition to the formation of a provisional coalition government. The account also fails to report Vy's criticizing the U.S. delegate for putting forward a series of questions at the previous session seeking to blame the DRV-PRG side for blocking progress at Paris. Vy in turn asked a number of questions of the U.S. delegation, all proceeding from the basic one--when will the United States give up its policy of aggression in Vietnam and rapidly, completely and unconditionally withdraw its forces from South Vietnam?

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\* Vietnamese communist propaganda continues routine comment on the Con Son prison, but with a reduced volume in comparison to the previous weeks. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN articles on 22-23 July, an LPA commentary on the 23d, and a Hanoi radio commentary of the 22d are the main items discussing the prison conditions.

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In standard fashion VNA says that GVN representative Nguyen Xuan Phong "reeled off old sophisms and distortions which show the obdurate stand of his bosses." And VNA says U.S. delegate Habib made a "lengthy speech on the so-called 'prisoners-of-war' problem in a bid to conceal the war crimes committed by the United States and its puppets in South Vietnam and mislead world public opinion, which is severely condemning the United States and its puppets for ruthlessly torturing the patriots detained in South Vietnam prisons."

FRONT ON BRUCE  
APPOINTMENT

Neither Hanoi or the Front comments on Ambassador Bruce's visit to Saigon. But a Liberation Radio commentary on the 28th again ridicules his appointment to head the Paris delegation as a "token gesture" which the Nixon Administration was forced to make in the wake of the expansion of the war into Cambodia. The commentary also ridicules statements earlier in the month by Secretary Rogers in Japan and General Westmoreland in South Vietnam regarding the Administration's desire for a peaceful settlement. Calling these statements part of the "scheme" to soothe public opinion, the commentary claims that the U.S. "aggressive policy" remains unchanged. It concludes with the assertion made periodically in the past that the South Vietnamese people "will never entertain any illusions" regarding U.S. peace talk and that they are "determined never to accept the U.S.-style peace conditions."

#### MOSCOW SCORES U.S. STAND ON SETTLEMENT, PRC POLICY

Moscow continues to avoid a substantive discussion of an Indochina settlement, limiting itself to criticism of the U.S. stand. Commenting on President Nixon's 20 July press conference, a 22 July IZVESTIYA article says that the President's opposition to a coalition government and faster troop withdrawal in effect turned down hopes of the American public for a swift peaceful settlement in Indochina. A broadcast over Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress on the 24th similarly comments that the press conference shows that the Administration has no desire to change its policy.

A commentary by Aleksei Leontyev, broadcast in English to North America on the 24th, says that the Administration is "using Thieu for its own ends" in order to be able to go back on its promises.

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Leontyev declares that while Washington claims it wants a speedy end to the war and has a peace plan including "the formation of a coalition government that would reflect the balance of political forces in South Vietnam," Thieu opposes a political settlement including the formation of a coalition government. On the same day a domestic service report on Ambassador Bruce's visit to Saigon says that he talked with the Saigon leaders about "how to continue applying the brakes" to the Paris talks.

The Moscow domestic service on the 22d reports that a session of the National Security Council discussed future strategy at the Paris talks. And it cites "officials" for the opinion that "no great hopes" should be pinned to the Bruce mission, which has "rigid instructions" not to agree to the DRV and PRG demands for an unconditional troop withdrawal and "cessation of support" for the Saigon regime.

ATTACK        Moscow's continued attacks on Peking's Indochina  
ON PRC        policies include a broadcast in Mandarin to  
             Southeast Asia on 22 July, pegged to a 14 July  
NCNA commentary on Secretary Rogers' Asian tour, which says  
that Peking's policy of "self-reliance" for the Asian countries  
aids the imperialists. Peking's policy, says the commentary,  
fits with the United States' Guam doctrine of encouraging  
Asians to be self-reliant in their own defense. The commentary  
asserts that the Vietnamese can wage "a protracted and victorious  
struggle" only with the "internationalist support of the  
socialist countries." Peking's policy of self-reliance has  
"isolated" the people of small countries, it says, and they  
will be defeated because they cannot match the strength of  
imperialism.

#### PRC DENOUNCES U.S. "PEACE FRAUD," SOVIET "COLLABORATION"

Peking spokesmen continue to denounce the notion of an Indochina settlement, with oblique slaps at the Soviets for "collaborating" in the U.S. "peace fraud." PLA Chief of General Staff Huang Yung-sheng, speaking at a 25 July banquet for a visiting DPRK military delegation, says that the United States, "in collaboration with certain people, is contriving peace talk proposals for a so-called 'political solution' of the Indochina question." Similarly, at a banquet for a Romanian military delegation on the 23d Huang had said that the

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Nixon Administration is employing "counterrevolutionary dual tactics" and that the "so-called 'troop withdrawal' from Cambodia is sheer fraud." He added that "the collaborator of U.S. imperialism is acting in response overtly and covertly."

The 27 July joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY on the 17th anniversary of the signing of the Korean armistice agreement says that the Americans in Indochina "have long torn the agreements of the two Geneva conferences to scraps." But it says the Nixon Administration is now again playing up a "new peace fraud," contriving "so-called negotiations of the Geneva-conference type," and that "certain people" run errands for U.S. imperialism and "serve as its accomplice in an overt or covert way."

#### CHOU EN-LAI HAILS FRENCH POLICY ON INDOCHINA

NCNA on 28 July carries an account of Chou En-lai's interview with French correspondents on the 14th, including his remark that Minister Bettencourt (who visited the PRC from 7-22 July) has on many occasions stated that the French Government under Pompidou will continue to follow De Gaulle's foreign policy. Chou then pointedly recalls De Gaulle's "famous speech" in Cambodia in September 1966 in which he expressed "firm support for Sihanouk's policy of independence, peace, and neutrality, and maintained that the U.S. troops should be withdrawn from South Vietnam so that the Vietnamese may solve their problems on their own."

Chou's remarks may have been an effort to downgrade the 1 April French cabinet statement which expressed concern about the spread of the Vietnam war to Laos and Cambodia and suggested general negotiations leading to "a zone of neutrality and peace." Peking had ignored the French proposal until 24 April, when it was mentioned in an NCNA commentary denouncing Soviet UN delegate Yakov Malik's remarks on a new Geneva conference. NCNA listed among developments in the U.S. "peace talks fraud" the urging of the Cambodian regime "to accept the French proposal on the convening of a new Geneva conference to discuss the Indochinese situation."\*

AFP on 26 July, reporting an interview with Thiounn Mumm, minister in Sihanouk's government, before his departure from

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\* See the FBIS TRENDS of 29 April, pages 1-3.

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Paris for a tour of East Europe, notes that in reply to a question on a Cambodian settlement he said that his government considered "very positive" a statement by Pompidou that there can be no peace in Indochina so long as the United States has not withdrawn its troops. In response to another question he added that Sihanouk's government is the only legal one and should be the only one representing Cambodia at a "conference table." He did not, however, directly acknowledge that the French have proposed an international conference on Indochina.

#### LAOS: SOUPHANOUVONG MESSAGE TO SOUVANNA, GENEVA ANNIVERSARY

The only current propaganda bearing on recent speculation about talks among the Lao parties comes in a 28 July Radio Pathet Lao broadcast which said that Souphanouvong's "special envoy" Tiao Souk Vongsak had left Sam Neua for Vientiane to deliver a message to Souvanna Phouma on "some concrete problems in solving the nation's situation."\*

HANOI AND FRONT Hanoi marks the 8th anniversary of the signing of the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos with the usual NHAN DAN editorial and Fatherland Front message. And the usual DRV Foreign Ministry statement is publicized belatedly by the Hanoi domestic service on 29 July. Hanoi also reports that the NLHS information bureau in Hanoi held a press conference to publicize the 20 July NLHS memorandum. Both the foreign ministry statement and the NHAN DAN editorial praise the memorandum and say that the DRV supports the NLHS 6 March five-point political program as the correct basis for a settlement of the Laotian question. The United States, it says, must stop all acts of intervention and aggression, "first of all" ending the bombing of Laotian

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\* As reported in the FBIS TRENDS of 22 July, page 11, a Pathet Lao radio broadcast on the 21st quoted an NLHS Central Committee member as telling a press conference in Sam Neua that "recently" Souphanouvong "sent" Tiao Souk Vongsak to deliver a message to Souvanna. But an English-language KPL item on the 23d said that Souphanouvong "had decided to send" an envoy to Vientiane.

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territory totally and unconditionally, to "create conditions for the parties concerned in Laos to meet" and solve their internal affairs in accordance with the "present realities" in Laos and the "basic principles" of the 1962 Geneva agreements.

The Front and the PRG mark the anniversary with a message from Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat to Souphanouvong supporting the 6 March NLHS program and the 20 June memorandum.

PEKING Peking's attention to the anniversary includes NCNA summaries of the NLHS memorandum and of the NHAN DAN editorial; NCNA omits the references to a settlement, stressing instead the determination of the Laotian people to continue the struggle. An NCNA report of the NFLSV message, however, does note that it backed the 6 March program and the 20 July memorandum and demanded an end to U.S. aggression, particularly the bombing, "so as to provide conditions for the Laotian people to settle their own affairs without foreign interference." The message did not, however, refer to a meeting of the Laotian parties concerned. On 24 July an NCNA Chinese-language transmission provides "international background material" on the 1962 Geneva agreements, as it had done on 20 July for the 1954 Geneva agreements anniversary, briefly reviewing the content of the agreements and charging that the United States "wantonly broke" them.

Peking apparently ignored the anniversary last year, and in 1968 marked the occasion only with an NCNA summary of the NLHS statement. In 1967 it gave the anniversary greater attention, including a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

MOSCOW Moscow marks the anniversary with routine-level radio and press comment, customary practice except in 1968 when it inexplicably ignored the anniversary. TASS also briefly reports the NLHS memorandum and the NFLSV message.

A 24 July PRAVDA article by Shchedrov, apparently timed to coincide with the anniversary, describes a visit to Laos including an interview with NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit. The commentator quotes Vongvichit as saying that the first step towards negotiations must be the cessation of U.S. bombing and shelling "of liberated regions," and that a settlement must be based on the principles of the 1962 Geneva agreements and take account of "the actual situation as it exists." Shchedrov recalls that Souphanouvong has

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called for a conference of "all Laotian political leaders" and points to the recent exchanges of messages between Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma, adding that in Vientiane he had met "a number of rightwing military and political figures" who also supported the idea of a political settlement in Laos. But he adds that "one of the main reasons" that negotiations remain only at the discussion stage is the American refusal to stop the bombing.

Moscow, however, says little else on its own regarding negotiations. And a 23 July broadcast in English to South Asia on the 15 July Supreme Soviet statement says nothing about the passage on political settlement, instead referring to the statement's demand for U.S. troop withdrawal from Indochina and for observance of the Geneva agreements. An IZVESTIYA article on the same day praises the 6 March NLHS program as being "based on the Geneva agreements and taking account of the present real situation in that country." On 27 July TASS carries an interview with Soth Pethrasi, NLHS representative in Vientiane, in which he repeated the demand for a bombing cessation, saying that "we do not want to hold talks under the threat of American bombs."

#### SOUTH VIETNAM: MILITARY ACTION, PLAF ENGAGES IN FARMING

Vietnamese communist propaganda on recent military action in the South includes a flurry of attention to the U.S. abandonment of Firebase Ripcord, or hill 935, in northern Thua Thien Province, on 23 July. According to the VNA press review on the 25th, all of Hanoi's dailies headline the action, claiming that the PLAF put out of action nearly 1,700 Americans and destroyed 97 aircraft and 13 heavy artillery pieces in the 23-day battle.

A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial on the 25th, in commenting on the U.S. abandonment of the base, says that the "crippling blow" meted out to elements of the U.S. 101st Airborne Division amounts to the "biggest feat of arms" achieved by the Thua Thien PLAF since seizing control of Hue during the 1968 Tet offensive. This is the "heaviest punishing blow" suffered by the 101st Division since moving into the area, notwithstanding the Division's losses in the A Bia engagement last year, says the editorial.

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PLAF FARMING IN Hanoi radio on the 22d carries an article  
CENTRAL TRUNG BO "sent by Minh Vy from the South" that  
discusses the PLAF's role in farm production  
in central Trung Bo.\* Minh Vy--who is not known to have authored  
previous articles--points up the production successes of the  
armed forces in the face of the allied "plot" of attacking "our  
rear bases in order to destroy all human and material resources."  
He claims that "tens of thousands of hectares of hills and  
dense jungles have been turned into terraced fields of manioc,  
sweet potatoes, maize and paddy."

The writer says that the central Trung Bo combatants, in  
addition to fighting, have overcome the problem of "seeds,  
soil, tools, manpower, and so forth" in satisfactorily fulfilling  
production tasks, and in spite of such factors as "dense jungles  
and mountains, scattered population, backward cultivation methods  
and fierce enemy attacks." Minh Vy says that one-third of the  
"303d PLAF unit" and the 1st company of the Gia Lai (GVN Pleiku  
Province) PLAF are engaged in farm production. He notes that  
the latter company, after having achieved self-sufficiency in  
the food supply problem for itself was able to supply enough  
food for another company. The author claims that over the past  
few years the central Trung Bo PLAF and people have under  
"fierce" wartime conditions both fought and actively participated  
in production "in order to produce more food so that the  
liberation troops can eat their fill and participate in the  
anti-U.S. national salvation resistance."

#### DRV CHARGES B-52'S IN DMZ, CLAIMS PLANE DOWNED

Hanoi on 28 July releases a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's  
statement of that day charging the United States with using  
B-52's\*\* to bomb the northern part of the DRV on three  
consecutive days, 23-25 July. The spokesman claims that  
B-52's and "other types of aircraft" dropped a series of  
demolition and steel-pellet bombs on Hucng Lap village in the

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\* The area covered by central Trung Bo generally corresponds  
to the delta and highland zones of GVN Military Region II plus  
the northern provinces of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai  
of GVN MR I.

\*\* The last previous DRV charges of the U.S. use of B-52's came  
in foreign ministry spokesman's statements on 27 and 30 May.  
See the FBIS TRENDS of 3 June 1970, page 9.

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northern part of the demilitarized zone. In standard fashion, the statement says that the DRV Government "strongly denounces and sternly condemns" these "criminal acts" and demands an end to all U.S. acts "violating" DRV sovereignty and security.

Hanoi radio on 27 July claims that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane was downed over Vinh Phu Province that afternoon. This brings Hanoi's total of U.S. planes claimed to 3,357.

#### HANOI MARKS WAR INVALIDS DAY

Hanoi marks the 23d anniversary of "War Invalids Day" (27 July) this year, as it did last year,\* with "instructions" from Premier Pham Van Dong on observance of the anniversary and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial claiming good results in implementing the policy toward war dead and disabled and their families. The "instructions" this year are more explicit concerning the payment of allowances to families of war dead and of "soldiers fighting in faraway places." It stresses that the payment "must be made at home, personally, on time, and completely."

Media on the 26th report a visit by President Ton Duc Thang to war invalids and sick army men under treatment in the 3d military zone. He was reportedly accompanied by Song Hao, head of the General Political Department of the VPA. Like last year, Premier Pham Van Dong on the 27th headed a delegation which laid wreaths at the monument to fallen heroes in Hanoi to mark the anniversary. Also on the 27th, Vo Nguyen Giap headed a delegation which visited Military Hospital 108.

#### CAMBODIAN FRONT RADIO WILL BEGIN BROADCASTS ON 1 AUGUST

A Hanoi English-language broadcast on 28 July carries an announcement from the Cambodian Front Information Bureau that its radio will begin broadcasts on 1 August and that Hanoi will relay two of the four transmissions.

There have been previous reports from Sihanouk officials indicating the establishment in the near future of a "liberation radio" station. VNA on 10 June reported that Sihanouk's defense minister Khieu Samphan, who is reportedly active in a Cambodian "liberated zone," said in his 25 May message to Prince Sihanouk in Peking that "preparations are under way for a Cambodian national liberation radio." And according to an AFP dispatch of 3 July, Finance Minister Thiounn Mumm "confirmed" in an interview with AFP that two liberation radio stations would begin operating in Cambodia on 5 July.

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\* For a discussion of earlier observances of the occasion see the FBIS TRENDS of 6 August 1969, page 7.

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## MME. BINH CONTINUES VISIT TO INDIA, PROCEEDS TO CEYLON

On 17 July, the day before Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh arrived in New Delhi, Liberation Radio announced that the PRG Foreign Minister would visit India "in the near future." But Front media's first acknowledgment of her arrival came in LPA dispatches on the 22d. LPA echoes earlier Soviet and DRV reports that her activities included meetings with President V.V. Giri and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on the 20th. LPA reports that she informed the Indian leaders of the PRG stand on a settlement of the Vietnam and Indochina issues and that she told Singh that the aim of her visit is to "achieve greater contacts between the PRG and the Indian Government and to strengthen friendship between the two peoples."

Mme. Binh's meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her press conference on the 22d are reported by TASS that day and by LPA on the 24th. LPA quotes her as claiming that the visit had reached its goal of "opening the way for good relations between the PRG and the Indian Government."\* TASS reports only that she said at the press conference that the visit had contributed to the strengthening of understanding between the two peoples. But the TASS report of the Binh-Gandhi meeting says that they "discussed questions of strengthening relations" between the PRG and India.

Mme. Binh's arrival in Ceylon on the 27th so far has been noted by TASS and NCNA but not Vietnamese communist media. The projected visit "in the last week of the month" was announced by LPA on the 24th. NCNA in its report quotes Mme. Binh on her arrival as expressing gratitude for the "recent decision by the Ceylonese Government . . . to extend full diplomatic recognition to the PRG." A Moscow broadcast in English to South Asia on the 26th, on the eve of the visit, called it the "start of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ceylon and the PRG." And

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\* Earlier Indian press reports said that Mme. Binh was pressing the Indian Government for formal recognition of the PRG.

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it added that the Ceylon Government's solidarity with the Vietnam people was "recently confirmed" by the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the DRV.\*

## FOREIGN TRAVELS OF OTHER VIETNAMESE, SIHANOUK OFFICIALS

VIETNAMESE ALLIANCE NCNA on 22 July reports the arrival in  
DELEGATION ON TOUR Peking of a Vietnam Alliance delegation  
headed by Trinh Dinh Thao, Alliance  
president and vice president of the PRG Advisory Council.  
NCNA notes that the group stopped in Peking on its way to  
"visit other countries," and on the 23d says that Chou  
En-lai met the delegation for a "cordial and friendly  
talk." LPA on the 23d reports the group's departure "from  
South Vietnam" for a friendship visit to Hungary. The  
stopover in Peking was not mentioned by Front media until  
the 27th, when LPA reports the meeting with Chou En-lai  
and says the delegation left Peking for Moscow on the 26th.

HOANG QUOC VIET A Moscow broadcast on 27 July reports  
IN PARIS, USSR that Hoang Quoc Viet, President of  
the Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions,  
had a discussion that day with A.N. Shelepin, CPSU Politburo  
member and AUCCITU chairman, "in the light of the decisions of  
the World Trade Union conference in Paris." The broadcast  
says that Viet is making a stopover in Moscow, presumably on  
his return to Hanoi. VNA had reported Viet's departure from  
Hanoi on the 15th to attend the 18-19 July Paris conference  
of "solidarity with the Indochinese peoples," but DRV media  
have not yet mentioned his departure from Paris. VNA on  
22 July carries a report on the conference proceedings and  
on the 24th reports that a general resolution voicing "full  
support to the fighting Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodian  
people" and a message to the workers and peoples of Vietnam,  
Laos and Cambodia had been passed at the closing session.

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\* VNA on 15 July reported the Ceylon Foreign Ministry announce-  
ment that day of full diplomatic recognition of the DRV as of  
24 June. Communist regimes, including the DRV and PRG,  
approvingly greeted the 27 May election of Ceylon's United  
Front Government led by Mme. Bandaranaike; they had been  
promised full diplomatic recognition by the United Front  
in its preelection program. See the FBIS TRENDS of 15 July,  
pages 41-43.

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SIHANOUK MINISTER IN PARIS, EAST EUROPE      AFP on 26 July reports that Thiounn Mumm, Finance and Economy Minister in Sihanouk's government, after attending the trade union conference left Paris for an "official tour" to Warsaw, Budapest and East Berlin and would then return to Peking via Moscow. TASS on 29 June had reported that Mumm on a visit to Moscow had met with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, but Soviet media are not known to have mentioned his departure. On 3 July AFP reported that he had left for Peking to report to Sihanouk, postponing a planned tour of East Europe.

SIHANOUK OFFICIALS' VISIT TO LAOS      On 25 July Radio Pathet Lao reports that at the invitation of the NLHS Central Committee a delegation of Sihanouk's government and of the FUNK visited Laotian "liberated areas" from 19 to 25 July. The delegation was headed by Dr. Ngo Hou, Public Health, Religious, and Social Affairs Minister, and included Gen. Duong Sam Ol, Military Equipment and Armament Minister. The group was received by a committee of members of the NLHS Central Committee. And the Pathet Lao radio on the 27th reports that the delegation paid a "courtesy call" on Prince Souphanouvong, who also attended a rally for them on the 21st. According to the broadcast, the group also called on Khamsouk Keola, chairman of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces Alliance Committee. The Pathet Lao news agency KPL on the 28th carries an editorial welcoming the "friendship visit" and stressing Indochinese solidarity as evidenced by the April summit meeting.

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## MIDDLE EAST

## MOSCOW NOTES UAR, JORDAN ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. INITIATIVE

Moscow reports both the UAR's 22 July acceptance of the U.S. peace initiative and Jordan's 26 July announcement that an affirmative reply was approved by the Jordanian cabinet, but appears to adopt a wait-and-see attitude on the Middle East problem. The UAR's acceptance was first reported in a broadcast in English to Great Britain on the 22d which said that the Cairo AL-AHRAM, reporting a statement by the UAR foreign minister, pointed out that "it replies to America's so called peace proposals for the Middle East." TASS on the 27th again attributes to AL-AHRAM a report on the Jordanian foreign minister's statement that the Jordanian Government unanimously endorsed "a positive reply" to the U.S. initiative and that Jordan's reply "is in full accordance with that of the UAR." Moscow media have not, of course, given any propaganda indication of the "positive" Soviet reaction conveyed by Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rogers on the 23d, as reported in the U.S. press.

NASIR TASS' initial report on President Nasir's 23 July  
SPEECH anniversary speech--transmitted in the Russian  
service while Nasir was still speaking--did not  
mention his acceptance of the U.S. initiative. A longer  
account of Nasir's speech, opening the fourth session of  
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) National Congress, was carried  
by TASS late on the 24th and appeared in PRAVDA the next day.  
The account notes that the UAR in its 22 July reply to Secretary  
Rogers accepted the U.S. proposals, at the same time pointing  
out that the proposals "do not contain anything new and are  
only a repetition of the Security Council resolution."\*

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\* Secretary Rogers' 19 June letter to the UAR suggests that Israel and the UAR subscribe to a restoration of the cease-fire for at least a limited period--three months is mentioned--and that the sides subscribe to a statement, to be issued by Ambassador Jarring, indicating that having accepted implementation of the November 1967 Security Council resolution in all its parts, they will hold discussions under Jarring's auspices. The purpose of the discussions would be to reach agreement on establishment of peace between them based on mutual acknowledgment of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and on Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict.

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Nasir stressed, TASS adds, that "it is important and necessary" that Ambassador Jarring should "receive directives from the four great powers." This seems compatible with the passage in the 17 July communique on Nasir's visit to the USSR in which the two sides supported "efforts undertaken in the framework of the United Nations" aimed at achieving a political settlement.

TASS says Nasir "sharply criticized" Washington's Middle East policy, pointing to "complete" U.S.-Israeli cooperation against the Arab states and charging the United States with supplying pilots, as well as aircraft and electronic equipment, to Israel. Nasir declared that the U.S. initiative cannot help solve the crisis, TASS says, "unless the United States assumes a decisive position with respect to ending deliveries of latest weapons to Israel." The account cites Nasir as saying that the UAR doesn't know the aims of the U.S. initiative or "in what degree the United States is able to influence the situation," and reports him as concluding that "we shall wait and see" what the U.S. position will be; if the United States continues its policy of delivering huge consignments of arms to Israel, "the situation will become serious."

The TASS account also notes Nasir's reiteration of the two UAR aims--achieving withdrawal of troops from all occupied territories and restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian peoples on the basis of the UN resolutions. Touching on the question of a cease-fire, TASS says, Nasir pointed out that Egypt was not the first to open fire.

TASS did not mention Nasir's acknowledgment of his secret visit to Moscow last January, or his remark that in discussions with the USSR--time unspecified--the Soviet leaders "told us they were prepared to support us militarily so we could build a defensive army and subsequently an offensive army which will help us liberate our occupied territories." Moscow has given no publicity to Nasir's question-and-answer session at the ASU Congress on the 24th, in the course of which he described the UAR reply to the U.S. initiative as "unconditional," said he had "no hope at all" of a peaceful solution, and remarked that the initiative "is not only the result of efforts by the United States but also efforts by the Soviet Union."

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ARAB                    While the Palestinian question was mentioned only  
OPPOSITION            in passing in the 24 July Congress session, and  
                         no comment on Jordan's position was solicited,  
several questions dealt with Arab opposition to the UAR's  
position. Giving assurances with regard to the Syrian front  
in response to several questions, Nasir commented at one  
point that he was reading these questions so the "Syrian  
brothers" would understand Egyptian concern for Syria. Asked  
if there was a formula to reconcile the U.S. initiative and  
Syria's rejection of the Security Council resolution, Nasir  
said he spoke with Syrian chief of state al-Atasi about  
"these matters" in Libya, and "there is agreement between us  
and Syria on all issues."

Moscow predictably has not been heard to refer to current  
Syrian and Iraqi reaffirmations of their rejection of the  
November Security Council resolution, as well as other  
"surrender" proposals. TASS on the 28th briefly reports  
from Damascus that Nasir's personal envoy met that day with  
al-Atasi and handed him a message from Nasir. And perhaps  
not coincidentally, Baghdad radio announced on the 27th that  
the Soviet ambassador had that day extended an invitation for  
an Iraqi party-government delegation to pay an official visit,  
and that the delegation would leave for Moscow on 4 August.

Neither has Moscow mentioned Palestinian dissent with the  
UAR-Jordanian acceptance of the U.S. initiative. A broadcast  
in Arabic on 25 June had noted "complete rejection" by the  
Palestinian resistance organizations of the statement that  
day by Secretary Rogers in which he announced the U.S.  
initiative.

Moscow has seemed particularly cautious in its treatment of  
the Palestinian movement since the early June fedayeen-army  
confrontation in Jordan. There has been little repetition  
in the past several months of the standard Moscow line that  
the Soviet Government regards as just the struggle of the  
Palestinian movement to liberate the "occupied territories";  
the last such statement was made by Dymshyts in response to a  
question at a 4 March press conference, and similar phraseology  
appeared in propaganda in February at the time a Palestinian  
delegation was visiting the USSR. An Arabic-language broadcast  
on 2 June pegged to the Palestine National Council session  
in Cairo noted that the Palestine resistance movement was  
receiving increasing international recognition "as a form  
of the Eastern Arabs' firm defense of their legitimate rights  
and interests."

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SUBSTANCE OF  
U.S. INITIATIVE

Focusing on the UAR revolution anniversary, comment portrays Nasir's anniversary speech as reaffirming the UAR's preparedness for a political solution and points approvingly to the "whole succession of constructive proposals advanced by the UAR" aimed at breaking the deadlock on a settlement. Propagandists take up Nasir's argument that the U.S. initiative does not differ from the November 1967 Security Council resolution. A broadcast in Arabic on the 24th did not explicitly mention the initiative in observing that the good will shown by Nasir has put to test the motives of those "who until very recently" have been encouraging the "Israeli aggressors." It did go on to say that the United States "is being compelled to talk about peace," and that Secretary Rogers "submitted a list of measures which are practically a repetition of the Security Council resolution which the United States previously evaded in every way." A Tsoppi foreign-language broadcast, also on the 24th, similarly claimed that "everything accepted in the new U.S. attitude" was included in Security Council documents long ago and was stressed by the Arab countries and the USSR. Tsoppi indicated some of the substance of the initiative in remarking that the United States has "changed its attitude" and now accepts the need for resumption of the Jarring mission and for implementation of the November resolution. If the United States really wants a political solution, Tsoppi added, it should "force" Israel to accept the resolution as a whole.

Soviet propagandists have not specifically addressed themselves to the substance of the initiative since Secretary Rogers' 19 June letter to the UAR was made public on 22 July. Prior to that time, propagandists had indulged in some speculation on the content, based on foreign press reports. In perhaps the fullest such discussion, Petrov in NEW TIMES No. 28 on 10 July noted that in announcing the initiative at a press conference on 25 June, Secretary Rogers said it consisted of inducing both sides to cease fire and begin negotiations with Ambassador Jarring in accordance with the Security Council resolution. Petrov cited Western news agency reports to indicate that an element of a settlement would include an Israeli declaration of a desire for withdrawal from occupied territories "on conditions of negotiations concerning a territorial settlement proceeding from security considerations." While he approvingly noted that the general tenor of the new proposals would seem to

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be "nearer the Arab countries' lawful aspirations," he questioned the implications of "security considerations" and the apparent silence on the matter of Israeli withdrawal from Syria's Golan Heights.

#### COMMENT ON UAR ANNIVERSARY EXTOLLS SOVIET ASSISTANCE

Moscow typically plays up the USSR's aid to the UAR in support of economic and technical projects--particularly the Aswan dam--and Egypt's defense potential, and praises the close UAR-Soviet relations. In an anniversary article in the 23 July PRAVDA, Belyayev said that the UAR "maintains the very closest relations with the Soviet Union; there is now no country closer than ours for the Egyptians." Hailing the "socialist orientation" of the UAR, Belyayev cautioned that proclamation of socialist slogans "by no means signified that the great aim of the revolution had been achieved," pointing out that Nasir has repeatedly stressed that the UAR's transitional period may last a very long time. Extolling the "Soviet example" which has "exerted a vast influence on the Egyptians," Belyayev said the choice of socialist orientation "was also made largely under the direct influence of our country in everything concerning the development of key branches of economy, education, and culture."

A Tyssovskiy article in the 23 July RED STAR, while stressing the UAR's desire for peace, pointed to the "immeasurable increase" in the combat readiness of the Egyptian army and its air defense, adding that the "active process of strengthening the defense lines in the Suez Canal zone is under way." The Egyptian people, Tyssovskiy said, "highly value the great aid" the Soviet Union is rendering in "restoring the UAR's defense potential" as well as in technical and economic assistance. While Moscow has not been known to refer publicly to terms of UAR payment for Soviet military assistance, TASS on the 27th, in reporting the ASU Congress recommendations, says it suggested that "internal means be sought to finance the military effort" and recommended the issuance of war bonds. (Nasir in a speech in Tripoli, Libya, on 22 June revealed that the UAR would pay for the Soviet arms "over 10 years beginning in 1971 at a low rate of interest.") TASS also briefly summed up the ASU political statement, noting that it stresses that

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the UAR has no wish for war for the sake of war but is striving to liberate all its territory, and that the delegates confirmed the need for further strengthening the UAR armed forces. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA observed on 26 July that the "peace initiative" advanced by Nasir in his 23 July speech "in no way denotes a weakening of the UAR's readiness to oppose the enemy." The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY is the only source for a 25 July report that the Soviet military attache in Cairo, in a statement to MENA on Soviet Navy Day, "affirmed his confidence that the UAR armed forces can liberate the occupied territory in the near future."

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## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## POLEMICAL RESTRAINT SUSTAINED; NO REPORTS ON TALKS

Both sides have maintained their propaganda standdown on border and bilateral issues while engaging in limited, low-key polemics on other questions. There has been no further announcement on this year's session of the joint commission for border river navigation, which opened on 10 July, and no confirmation of a replacement for Kuznetsov as chief negotiator at the Peking talks or of an impending exchange of ambassadors.

Prague's MLADA FRONTA on 23 July, in a wide-ranging review of Sino-Soviet relations in recent years, mentioned the border clashes of 1969 but cited Peking's acceptance of Stepanov as the new Soviet ambassador and its nomination of an ambassador to Moscow as possible harbingers of a gradual thaw in Sino-Soviet relations. The paper added, however, that "this obviously is designed only to eliminate the fear of political isolation." Other recent East European comment has similarly belittled the significance of Peking's resurgent diplomatic activity as signifying no basic change in strategy toward the Soviet bloc. Moscow has carried some of this comment, mainly for foreign consumption. An article in the Hungarian NEPSZABADSAG on 11 July, discussing recent Chinese foreign policy moves, was broadcast in Romanian, Serbo-Croatian, and Albanian and reprinted in the Soviet weekly LIFE ABROAD; and an article in Prague's RUDE PRAVO on 15 July, which discussed the PRC's satellite launching and growing nuclear potential, was broadcast in Mandarin and reprinted in the weekly NEW TIMES, which is disseminated in several foreign languages.

MOSCOW COMMENT A Moscow broadcast in French on 25 July, carrying an interview with a Soviet professor who recently visited France, complained that the French press has dramatized the Sino-Soviet dispute and appealed blandly for a restoration of normal relations with the PRC. For its part, Moscow has been avoiding any dramatization of the China problem, which has largely been ignored in Soviet comment except for continuing polemical probes in broadcasts to the PRC and to Overseas Chinese. Thus a broadcast in Mandarin to southeast Asia on 22 July claimed that Peking's line on self-reliance--the commentary alluded to Mao's 20 May statement--plays into the hands of President Nixon's Guam doctrine by exposing the Indochinese countries to defeat by the United States and its Asian allies.

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Moscow has also used its Mandarin broadcasts to taunt Peking for failing to match its anti-imperialist rhetoric with action. Recent broadcasts, coming after Chinese propaganda outcries marking the 20th anniversary of the interposition of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, stress that the United States uses Taiwan for military purposes and deride the Chinese for failing to take action to expel the alien presence. One Mandarin broadcast, in Radio Moscow's program for the PLA on the 23d, alluded to press reports about the construction of a Taiwan base capable of handling B-52's--about which Peking has remained silent--and took note of the recent visit to Taiwan of Army Chief of Staff Westmoreland.

A commentary in Mandarin on the 22d aired Moscow's old grievances against Mao for failing to follow the Comintern's instructions in the 1930's and for failing to aid the USSR against Japan during World War II. However, Moscow has generally abstained from the sharp personal attacks on Mao and his inner circle which formerly peppered its comment broadcast to China.

In addition to the general polemical restraint, another sign that Moscow has felt a need to modify its approach is contained in the joint communique between the CPSU and a visiting delegation of the Japan Socialist Party published in PRAVDA on 19 July. Referring to an Asian collective security system, a dormant subject in Soviet propaganda in recent months, the communique says the CPSU "affirmed its readiness" to seek such an arrangement while insisting on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region as the first step. The notion of an Asian collective security system had first been broached in the anti-Chinese context of Brezhnev's speech at the Moscow international communist conference in June 1969. Elaborating on it in an article on 3 August that year, IZVESTIYA's leading commentator Matveyev said the question of Asian security was assuming "an increasingly crucial nature" and took Peking to task for being hostile toward neighboring countries, provoking border troubles, and frustrating efforts to stabilize the situation. A summary of the CPSU-JSP communique broadcast by Moscow to south Asia, a favorite target audience of Soviet comment last year on Brezhnev's proposal, ignored the subject of collective security. Moscow may have included it in the communique in deference to the JSP and attached a tough anti-U.S. condition to the proposal in reaction to Peking's vigorous campaign to promote Asian unity against the United States.

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PEKING           The Chinese have confined their anti-Soviet polemics  
COMMENT           to oblique swipes at Moscow for allegedly collaborating  
                  with the United States and behaving like a superpower.  
Thus Chou En-lai, in an interview for French television recorded  
on 14 July and reported by NCNA on the 28th, observed that there  
are "one or two" unnamed superpowers which seek to bully the weak  
and contend for world hegemony. He paraphrased Mao's 20 May  
statement in noting that the danger of the big powers' launching  
a world war still exists, but he may have been reflecting a  
genuine confidence--in contrast to Chinese isolation and concern  
over Soviet intentions last year--in asserting that times have  
changed and the days past when the big powers decided the  
world's destiny.

The visit of the Romanian defense minister beginning on 23 July  
has occasioned veiled anti-Soviet attacks and expressions of  
Chinese support for Bucharest's show of independence. PLA Chief  
of Staff Huang Yung-sheng, speaking on the 23d, lauded the  
Romanian stand as a powerful blow at "those who practice 'power  
politics' and 'the policy of dictate.'" Also without naming  
Moscow, he charged that the Soviets had been collaborating  
"overtly and covertly" with the United States on the Indochina  
question. The current attacks, however, have been less harsh  
than those made by the Chinese during a visit by another  
Romanian delegation in June and have avoided the subject of  
European security, to which Chou En-lai had addressed himself  
on 11 June.

Huang Yung-sheng again rebuked the Soviets indirectly for  
collaborating with the United States on Indochina in his  
speech on 25 July at a banquet honoring a DPRK military  
delegation. A similar charge was pressed in a 27 July joint  
editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY marking  
the anniversary of the Korean armistice. Peking continues to  
avoid direct attacks on the Soviet leadership or on Soviet  
internal policies.

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## FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS

## LIMITED PUBLICITY FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS' MOSCOW TALKS

Minimal Soviet propaganda on the current round of FRG-Soviet talks which began in Moscow on 27 July between Foreign Ministers Scheel and Gromyko generally describes them as on "questions of mutual interest" and continues to obscure the fact that they are aimed at a renunciation-of-force agreement. This aim is acknowledged, however, in a PRAVDA article by Bragin on the 26th which typically notes opposition in West Germany to a FRG-Soviet detente.

PRAVDA's political observer Yuriy Zhukov, speaking on Radio Moscow's domestic service roundtable on the same day, makes an oblique reference to West German press leaks of the 10-point agreement purportedly negotiated between Gromyko and FRG State Secretary Bahr when he refers to "speculations and sensational publication of stolen documents."\* But he says merely that he would not stoop to polemics with the West German newspapers since "diplomacy is not done in the marketplace." Zhukov does not refer to a nonaggression agreement but says that the foundations of European security are recognition of "contemporary reality," rejection of the use of force, and the development of mutually profitable, equal business links.

TASS reported on the 26th that Scheel intended to stay in the Soviet Union until 31 July--a report which Hamburg's DPA promptly scored as "casting a shadow" on the opening of the talks. In apparent response to DPA's comment, TASS on the 27th said that "it has become known here that no time limit or date for completing the negotiations has been set."

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\* See the TRENDS of 22 July, pages 24-25, for earlier Moscow acknowledgments of the press leaks.

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## A F R I C A

## MOSCOW, PE'ING ASSAIL UK POLICY ON ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA

The British Government's announcement on 20 July that it is considering a resumption of arms sales to South Africa has evoked prompt Soviet and Chinese propaganda attempts to exploit the decision and competing efforts to depict themselves as true champions of African liberation. The most authoritative Soviet comment on the subject comes in an IZVESTIYA Observer article on 24 July, which denounces the "shameful deal" with the South African "racists" as an attempt to gain an "imperialist bridgehead" on the African continent. This bridgehead, Radio Moscow commentators tell their African listeners, will be used to suppress the national liberation movement.

A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, also on the 24th, takes a somewhat similar line in viewing Britain's intentions to lift the arms embargo to the Vorster regime as a threat to the African peoples. In contrast to the more cautious IZVESTIYA article, which does not mention the United States, the widely broadcast PEOPLE'S DAILY article directly charges Washington with complicity in the British decision.

SOVIET REACTION      The IZVESTIYA Observer article, entitled "A Deal Against the People of Africa," charges that the British Government's intention to sell arms to the South African regime "cannot be regarded otherwise than as an action that undermines the authority of the United Nations and threatens independent African states and the national liberation movement." It adds that to supply arms to South Africa means "in fact to supply arms to the whole racist-colonialist bloc which opposes the independent African peoples and countries who are fighting for their liberation from the colonial yoke." The article goes on to charge that the "deal" with the South Africans is in the "interests of NATO" and reflects British hopes to use South Africa as "a bridgehead of imperialism in Africa." In this context the article says that "recently South Africa's role has increased both as a result of the weakening of Britain's position 'East of Suez' and as a result of the closing of the Suez canal because of Israeli aggression."

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Some other Moscow comment suggests that the United States supports the British plan to lift the arms embargo as part of its global strategy to militarily link South Africa to the West. TASS on 22 July reported that the British and South Africans, "with the support of some NATO countries and above all the United States, obviously aim, if not to draw South Africa into NATO, then to join it in any other way to the military plans of the West." A participant in a Radio Moscow discussion program on the 26th alleged that "the United States is not opposing the sale of British arms to South Africa." He went on to suggest that the proposed arms deal was designed in part to draw attention from the Near East, "the more so as solidarity between African and Arab countries in the struggle against Israeli aggression has been gaining in strength."

Radio Moscow broadcasts to Africa focus on publicizing African opposition to the British announcement and stress the theme that supplying arms to the South Africans is an integral part of the imperialist plans to suppress African and other peoples. Thus a Radio Moscow broadcast in English to Africa on 25 July alleges that the British are pursuing the same objectives as "the Washington strategists in Vietnam." In both cases, it adds, the ultimate aim of London and Washington is to strike a blow at the Afro-Asian national liberation movement.

PEOPLE'S DAILY      The PEOPLE'S DAILY article, entitled "U.S.  
CHARGES              and British Imperialism's New Crime of  
                      Aggression in Africa," charges that Washington  
and London "are working hand in glove in resuming arms supplies to South Africa." Terming the South African regime "a lackey of British and U.S. imperialism," the commentator says that the United States supplies it with "35 million dollars' worth of military 'aid' every year." He goes on to charge that one of the objectives of Secretary Rogers' tour of Africa in February was "to hatch plots to sabotage the people's armed struggle and liberation movement in Southern Africa." Pointing to consistent Chinese support for the South African people against imperialism, the commentator expresses confidence that the African people will win complete victory in their struggle against "white colonial rule."

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## HUNGARY

### NEPSZABADSAG HAILS RESULTS OF FREEWHEELING ECONOMIC POLICIES

Hungary seems to be going out of its way to attribute its economic successes to developing trade relations with capitalist countries as well as with members of CEMA. Simultaneously, Soviet propagandists, in the wake of the founding of CEMA's investment bank last month, are stepping up the campaign for closer economic "integration" of the socialist states.

A 21 July NEPSZABADSAG editorial claimed unique success for Hungary's 1966-70 five-year plan: "We can proudly state that this is the first five-year plan which we not only fulfilled but substantially overfulfilled." This boast stands in contrast to the routine claims of plan fulfillment currently being issued by other CEMA states.

The editorial--keyed to the 15-16 July Hungarian party plenum, which reviewed present and future economic plans and set a November date for the next party congress--appeared to dismiss Hungary's obligations to CEMA as already easily taken care of and to stress instead relations with the West as the key to future successes. It affirmed that realization of the 1971-75 plan "is supported by the possibilities of purchases and sales within the CEMA countries, for the most part already coordinated, and by the economic ties already established with the capitalist countries, which are also expected to be expanded." Viewing the upcoming plan, developed along these lines, as one of "great and enthusiasm-inspiring aims," the editorial predicted that "the economy of our country, which today is on a level of medium-term development, will approach the level of the highly developed countries in five years' time."

**ATTITUDE OF MOSCOW**      Such enthusiastic expressions of intent by the Hungarians to expand economic relations with the capitalist world have evidently been a source of concern to Moscow. The clearest expression of such concern was a Radio Moscow commentary on 21 November, which stressed Hungary's "exceptional" need for CEMA--in view of that country's large population and "limited raw material resources"--and carried a reminder that "nowhere are wider opportunities offered the partners than within CEMA." Two days earlier, a NEPSZABADSAG article by a high Hungarian Foreign Trade Ministry official had

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boldly stated that "Integration between the socialist countries does not mean autarky" but has as "one of its important objectives the strengthening of our positions in worldwide economic cooperation."

More recently, Moscow's propaganda in support of the CEMA investment bank has primarily and sometimes explicitly been aimed at the still aloof Romanians, but it also stands in obvious contrast to the expressed views of the Hungarians on integration and CEMA's relations with the capitalist world. Thus a Dudinskiy article in the weekly LIFE ABROAD No. 28, signed to the press 8 July, stressed the prime role of CEMA integration in the member countries' economic successes: "The economic integration being implemented by the socialist countries belonging to CEMA opens up favorable prospects for rapid economic upsurge and scientific and technical progress." With the implementation of the integration, it added, "is linked the solution of the fundamental problems of building socialism and communism," and "the solution of this key task complicates the demands made on the fraternal countries' national economies." On the 23d, a Molchanova talk on the investment bank, carried in the domestic service, appeared to stress the kind of isolated role for CEMA which the Hungarians deplore: Progress in fuel, power, raw materials, mechanical engineering, and technology has "made the CEMA countries practically independent of the capitalist market," the commentary asserted. It added that "through their own production and mutual exchange" the CEMA countries "now satisfy over nine-tenths of their machine and equipment needs," and reiterated that "thus in the current situation" they "are practically independent of the capitalist market."

Soviet media's scanty coverage of the Hungarian party plenum and total ignoring of the 21 July NEPSZABADSAG editorial may account for a notably defensive article by Horvath in the 26 July NEPSZABADSAG. Horvath denounced alleged Western contentions that Hungary's successful "economic reform" amounts to a "new model of socialism"--the epithet used by Soviet propaganda for the 1968 Czechoslovak experiment. Stressing Budapest's support for bloc economic integration, Horvath insisted that the country's economic reform is not "a departure from socialism" but "an advance to socialism."

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## PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

### RED FLAG ARTICLES SET EDUCATIONAL LINE IN UNIVERSITIES

The first issue of RED FLAG devoted to a single subject since May 1967, the 25th anniversary of Mao's Yenan talks, carries several articles on the current stage of educational reform which indicate some progress in getting technical schools reopened and some retreat from the previous position of worker control of schools. However, the two major articles in the journal also serve as a warning to intellectuals that the resumption of classes does not indicate a complete return to the old system. Current plans follow the general outlines of less authoritative middle school-level models occasionally publicized last year which advocated the retention of most old teachers and the resumption of regular classes, but with politics remaining the supreme educational guide.

The special RED FLAG issue seems to have been intended in part as a commemoration of Mao's instructions in the summer of 1968; these advocated worker control of the schools and resulted in the dispatching of worker propaganda teams to the schools. Yet the major articles, a Shanghai forum on education and an article by the propaganda team at Tsinghua University, indicate a shift in emphasis from worker control of education to coordination between the schools and the factories. The Shanghai forum is particularly frank in openly noting disagreements and negotiations between factories and universities, and the Tsinghua article emphasizes factory-university "links" rather than control. Workers are to "take a direct part in every aspect of the teaching," but as part of "specialized teams" with students and teachers.

While previous proclamations on university education seemed to open the possibility that workers with little education would flood the system, RED FLAG seems to relegate such workers to part-time courses or to limit worker-students to a select few with "practical experience." The Tsinghua article states that students should "chiefly" be drawn from those who have three years of practical experience, are about 20 years old, and have at least finished junior middle school. They may be workers, peasants, soldiers, or young cadres, the article notes, and students sent down to

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the countryside early in the cultural revolution should be considered as well. Those in the latter category seem most likely to be able to fulfill the prior-education requirement.

The Shanghai forum also noted problems with insufficiently educated workers. One participant noted that "it now seems the worker-students taken in should still have some degree of education." Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao seemed reluctantly to concur, with the proviso that workers "with the best grades" in part-time schools be admitted to the regular university.

The course content of university classes, as advanced in the Tsinghua propaganda team article, must fulfill the dual requirement of allowing students to solve problems in practical production and "meeting the needs of the scientific and technical development" of China. Courses of study are to run two or three years, plus in some cases a year of advanced study "within or outside the colleges." The old teaching material is to be "critically taken over" in line with the policy of "making the past serve the present and foreign things serve China." Also in line with previous policy, the new system of education has no place for "pure theory" and higher mathematics. But here too there is some lessening of revolutionary strictures: the Tsinghua authors acknowledge that experience has shown that some basic courses, "the lack of which makes advanced learning impossible," should remain as separate courses and not be integrated into work tasks.

#### MERGER OF TWO MACHINE-BUILDING MINISTRIES INDICATED

The Hunan radio reported on 24 July that a national symposium on rice-transplanting machines, "convened by the First Ministry of Machine Building," opened in Chuchou on 23 July. The principal speaker was Hsu Pin-chou, formerly a vice-minister of the Eighth Ministry of Machine Building, which had been in charge of agricultural machinery; he is now referred to as a "responsible person of the First Ministry of Machine Building." The first ministry had been in charge of civilian machinery except for agricultural equipment; the latter category was probably added to its responsibilities in the recent ministerial amalgamations.

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## KOREA

### DPRK MILITARY IN PRC; ARMISTICE ANNIVERSARY; U.S.-ROK MEETING

Improved Sino-North Korean relations are again manifested by a visit to Peking by a North Korean military delegation led by O Chin-u, the chief of general staff. The chief of the PLA general staff, Huang Yung-sheng, had led a delegation to Pyongyang for the 25 June anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War.

In banquet speeches in Peking, both military chiefs hailed the friendship between the two countries, noting that it has recently been reinforced by the exchanges of delegations on the Korean War anniversary as well as by the visit of Chou En-lai to North Korea in April. Huang recalled the history of the two peoples' cooperation against the common enemy and said that the Chinese people and army "will, as always, unite and fight together with the fraternal Korean people and Korean Peoples' Army to seize new and greater victories." In attacking the U.S. "trick of troop withdrawal" from Cambodia, he implicitly criticized Moscow by scoring "certain people" for "collaborating" with the United States in "contriving peace talks proposals" for a political solution in Indochina.

O Chin-u effusively praised the Chinese for their past support, duly recalling the exploits of the Chinese volunteers during the Korean war. He recalled that Mao Tse-tung's 20 May statement was "an inspiration for the Asian people" and went on to quote Mao as saying that "so long as U.S. imperialism refuses to give up its arrogant and unreasonable demands and its scheme to extend aggression, the only course for the Chinese people is to remain determined to go on fighting side by side with the Korean people," an assertion that, in fact, did not appear in Mao's statement.

U.S.-ROK      Both Pyongyang and Peking authoritatively denounce  
MEETING      the 21-22 July U.S.-ROK defense ministry meeting  
                 in Honolulu, at which U.S. troop reduction and  
                 further aid to the ROK army was discussed, and the simultaneous  
                 annual Japan-ROK ministerial meeting held in Seoul. A 26 July  
DPRK Foreign Ministry statement said that the troop reduction  
is a "masquerade" to justify intensified U.S. aggression,

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reinforcement of the ROK army, and "the dispatch of Japanese aggressor troops to South Korea." A PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 26th raised the issue of Chinese security, saying that the two meetings are "grave steps" taken by the Americans and Japanese to intensify their aggression against Korea and constitute "serious provocations against the Chinese and other Asian people." It charged that the Americans and Japanese intend to turn South Korea into a "military base of aggression" against the DPRK, the PRC, and other Asian countries. Moscow has commented only at the routine level, saying that the conferences are part of the U.S. effort to apply the "Nixon doctrine" that would allow U.S. allies a more active role in implementing American strategic plans in Asia.

ARMISTICE                      Pyongyang marks the 17th anniversary of the  
ANNIVERSARY                    signing of the Korean armistice with a  
                                  Pyongyang city meeting and a NODONG SINMUN  
article by a KPA General. The propaganda is generally  
routine in content. Deputy Defense Minister, Kim Tae-hong,  
who addressed the meeting, and the press article portray  
the signing of the armistice as a great victory of the  
Korean people over U.S. imperialism. The comment is  
replete with stock warnings that "war may break out at any  
moment" and that the Koreans will "return all-out war for  
all-out war" if the Americans dare to attack.

The propaganda recalls that the Chinese helped the Koreans with volunteers, but as usual balances this with praise for the USSR and other socialist countries for having also provided "material and moral support." At the same time, however, some comments are implicitly critical of the USSR and in line with Peking's ideological stance on war. The Pyongyang domestic service, but not KCNA, quoted Kim Tae-hong as saying in his speech: "The people and troops should not be obsessed with peace sentiments and should maintain an alert posture at all times," and "we should prevent the development of any harmful ideological element afraid of war within the country as well as encroaching from without." The NODONG SINMUN article included the assertion that the victory in the Korean War proved that the "decisive factor" was not "superiority of weapons or technique but the strength of the masses of people."

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PEKING ON  
ANNIVERSARY

The close "unity" of the Korean and Chinese people is praised and Chinese determination to give the Koreans "resolute support" was reiterated in a 27 July joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY, and in speeches at a Peking banquet given by the DPRK Ambassador. A "worker-peasant-soldier battlefield forum" carried by NCNA in Chinese on the 26th reviewed "articles" by PLA personnel again praising the defeat of the Americans by the Korean and Chinese peoples in the Korean War, duly praising the Chinese volunteers.

The joint editorial once again linked Korea with Indochina to portray U.S. aggressive intent throughout Asia. After charging that in spite of its defeat in the Korean War the United States continues violating the Korean armistice with "provocations" against the DPRK, the editorial said that in Indochina the United States has similarly "torn the two Geneva agreements to scraps," and is playing a "peace fraud" by calling for "so-called negotiations of the Geneva-conference type." Again obliquely anti-Soviet, the editorial added that "certain people" run errands for the United States and "serve as its accomplice in an overt or covert way."

MOSCOW

Routine Moscow press comment marks the close of the "solidarity month" which was held from the 25 June Korean War anniversary to the 27 July armistice anniversary, but there is no explicit mention of the armistice anniversary in available Moscow propaganda. In the past, Moscow has marked the occasion at the routine level. Two PRAVDA articles, summarized by TASS on 25 and 27 July, routinely express support for the Korean struggle for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and for the "peaceful" unification of the country.

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